







5th International Conference Nuclear and Radiation Physics
Almaty, Kazakhstan
September 26, 2005 through September 29, 2005
Disclaimer 
 
 This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any 
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein 
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, 
and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 
 
IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN 
NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Jeffery H. Richardson




The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as 
weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD 
against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security.
These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass 
destruction—many different starting materials, material sources, and production 
processes. There are many possible proliferators—threshold countries, rogue states, state-
sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international 
crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging—
from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny access to a strategic area, or 
alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate.
Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or 
capability—no silver bullet—can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. 
An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism 
problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while 
avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different 
types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool 
in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced 
performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and 
simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field.
The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium 
(HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number 
of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to 
identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include 
monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and 
developing instruments for response personnel.
Radiation Detection Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
Lawrence Livermore, which has been developing radiation-related technologies for 
decades, continues to adapt radiation detection devices for national security needs. In 
1999, the Laboratory began forming its Radiation Detection Center (RDC), a 
multidisciplinary organization that centralizes Livermore’s radiation detection efforts. 
The RDC’s mission is to provide a focal point for radiation detection activities across 
LLNL, bringing together the LLNL community of radiation detection specialists and 
thereby creating a center of excellence in radiation detection at LLNL. The RDC helps to 
initiate and support many projects throughout LLNL that are developing new technology 
for national security and basic science programs.
The RDC’s primary focus is the detection, identification, and analysis of nuclear 
materials and weapons. Specifically, the RDC:
· Fosters the development and support of innovative radiation detection techniques 
and technologies required in many technical fields (e.g., nuclear physics, nuclear 
chemistry, particle physics, atomic physics, plasma physics, astrophysics, medical 
technology, nondestructive evaluation) to meet programmatic goals (e.g., in 
stockpile stewardship, nonproliferation, homeland security, emergency response).
· Serves as an institutional resource in radiation detection for LLNL and U.S. 
government agencies.
· Provides special facilities for instrument development, demonstrations, and joint 
experiments in radiation detection.
· Trains individuals in the use of radiation detection equipment and protocols (e.g., 
U.S. Customs, IAEA, Euratom, academic classes).
Imaging Detectors
One of the challenges facing nuclear researchers today is developing smarter detection 
systems that distinguish between radiation emissions from background and legitimate 
sources (e.g., medical isotopes) and those from threatening sources. Radioactive material 
is everywhere, from the concrete in our streets to the food we eat. Advances are being 
made in semiconductor-based gamma-ray imaging detectors. These imagers use 
increased sensitivity and spatial resolution to detect weak radioactive sources that would 
otherwise be masked by background gamma-ray emissions. Gamma-ray imagers are 
particularly useful when searching for lost, stolen, or hidden nuclear material in a large 
area. Two gamma-ray imaging approaches, with different objectives, are being pursued at 
LLNL.
The first imager is a hybrid semiconductor-based, collimatorless Compton imaging 
instrument. Recent efforts are working toward confirming that improvements can be 
achieved by using semiconductor-based, high-energy, position-resolution Compton 
imaging systems. The Compton camera operates without a mask or collimator, which can 
block many of the gamma rays emitted from a source. Instead, gamma rays coming from 
all directions at once are tracked as they scatter inside the detector. The camera’s omni-
directional sensitivity is significantly higher than that of other imaging systems. 
Mathematical algorithms are used to retrace the paths of the gamma rays within the 
detector, and the results reveal the direction of the source. The main goal for the camera 
is to detect clandestine nuclear materials. A field deployable prototype of the Compton 
camera is still a few years away. These systems will be modular and are therefore 
scalable from compact (near- and mid-range detection) and potentially portable systems 
to large-scale (long-range detection) and transportable systems. The initial hybrid system 
uses two double-sided strip detectors (DSSD) made from high-purity Si and Ge. This 
instrument has demonstrated imaging from energies of 120 keV to 12 MeV.
The second imager is based on a coded-aperture approach using NaI detector elements. 
Called GRIS (gamma ray imaging system), this instrument is useful for a variety of 
applications, including treaty inspections, mapping radioactive contamination, and 
determining what is inside a suspect object. The images are encoded on the detector by 
placing a sheet of material opaque to the radiation in front of the detector. The sheet is 
pierced with a carefully selected hole pattern that allows researchers to mathematically 
recover the image with a simple computer program. GRIS was first developed for use in 
treaty inspections to monitor the location of nuclear missile warheads in a non-intrusive 
manner. Another version of GRIS being developed, the large-area imager, is suited for 
longer-range searches. The large area imager, approximately the size of a sofa, is 
mounted in a small truck and is capable of picking out weak radioactive sources from as 
far away as 100 meters. This project is leveraging mature technology, and a field 
prototype is being tested.
Active Interrogation to Detect Shielded Nuclear Material
LLNL is developing a concept for the detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 
other materials of concern that is suitable for use in inspecting maritime cargo containers. 
A new radiation signature unique to special nuclear material (SNM) has been identified 
that uses high-energy (3- to 7-MeV), fission-product gamma-ray emission. This high-
energy gamma signature is robust, in that it is very distinct compared to normal 
background radiation where there is no comparable high-energy gamma radiation. It has 
a tenfold higher yield than delayed neutrons, which are the basis of classical active 
interrogation normally used on small, unshielded specimens of nuclear material. 
Experiments have verified this signature and its predicted characteristics. The first 
experiment was done at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s 88-inch cyclotron, 
where directing a deuteron beam onto a beryllium target produced low-energy neutrons, 
and the fission-product high-energy gamma rays from very small HEU and plutonium 
samples were characterized. Subsequently, experiments were configured at LLNL where 
a 14-MeV commercial D-T neutron generator (2 x 1010 neutrons/second) was used to 
interrogate a 22-kg natural uranium target located inside a standard cargo container at a 
distance of 3 meters. We are now in the process of building a prototype that will include a 
new neutron source and detectors for improved performance.
Ultrahigh-Resolution Spectroscopy
LLNL is also developing spectrometers with ultrahigh energy resolution using 
superconducting micro calorimeter thermistor technology. These spectrometers are based 
on measuring the temperature rise that results from gamma ray or neutron absorption. 
They offer an order-of-magnitude improvement in energy resolution over conventional 
semiconductor and gas-based spectrometers, making possible high-precision isotopic 
analysis of nuclear materials in cases where high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors 
(the current state of the art) lack the spectral resolution to separate nearby emission lines. 
Such a capability is needed for various nuclear nonproliferation, monitoring, and 
forensics applications. To date, we have developed spectrometers that have already 
achieved a resolution below 0.1% for soft gamma rays (energies of 60 to 120 keV), 
which is more than five times the theoretical best resolution for HPGe spectrometers and 
a resolution below 1% for neutrons (2.3 MeV). The ultrahigh-resolution neutron 
spectrometer uses lithium fluoride to absorb incoming neutrons. It then measures the 
released energy from the neutrons interacting with the lithium fluoride combined with the 
energy of the neutrons as they enter the detector. Work is under way to increase 
spectrometer sensitivity by several orders of magnitude by building detector arrays, first 
using arrays of single pixels and then using arrays of multiplexed pixels.
New Detector Material
LLNL is developing aluminum antimonide (AlSb) as a promising new material for 
achieving germanium-like energy resolution in a room-temperature radiation detector. 
Although germanium detectors, which operate at liquid nitrogen temperatures, are 
unsurpassed for high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, there is a continuing need for 
an ambient-temperature gamma-ray detector with the portability and convenience of a 
scintillator but with significantly improved energy resolution. Based on theoretical band-
structure calculations, computer-simulated energy spectrum analyses, and LLNL’s 
achievement in producing significantly high-resistivity single crystals, the III-V 
semiconductor AlSb holds promise for ambient-temperature, high-energy gamma 
detection. To produce electronic-device-quality AlSb single crystals, we have had to 
overcome technical challenges related to crystal purity and stoichiometry that have 
discouraged other researchers from pursuing AlSb for this application. Our first 
processing breakthrough led to Czochralski growth of large, undoped AlSb crystals with 
a resistivity of >106 ohm-cm. Our second processing breakthrough was the use of a 
controlled atmospheric heat treatment to adjust crystal stoichiometry, which led to the 
production of high-resistivity, undoped single crystals of AlSb. By combining these two 
processing methods, we can produce single crystals of AlSb with resistivity of >107 ohm-
cm which have been used in radiation detection. Further processing optimization is 
expected to produce AlSb crystals suitable for gamma-ray detection at room temperature.
Nuclear Detection Systems
Combining various types of radiation detection devices into a network that maximized 
the benefits of each is a challenge to improving the use of radiation detection for the 
prevention of proliferation. Sensor fusion is the discipline that permits data to be 
combined and produce a sum greater than the parts. For example, information from a 
portable radiation detection system can be combined with that from handheld detectors 
and video cameras, and all of the data can be integrated to give a more complete report 
than one type of detector could provide. LLNL has several projects under way to develop 
integrated systems for detecting nuclear or radioactive material.
· Personal System. RadNet is a low cost handheld radiation detector that includes 
a cellular telephone, a personal digital assistant with Internet access, and a Global 
Positioning System locator. The recently developed RadNet detector is both 
inexpensive (< $1000) and easily dispersed. When it is not measuring specific 
radioactive samples, a RadNet unit monitors the ambient radiation field and 
communicates with a central processing system in real time.
· Road-Based System. The Detection and Tracking System (DTS) is a rapidly 
deployable, reconfigurable network of sensors that can detect, characterize, and 
track ground-delivered nuclear and radioactive threats. A 20-node system, 
developed in partnership with the Remote Sensing Laboratory, has been 
demonstrated near the entrance of a U.S. Army base. The system featured a new 
tracking algorithm that uses spectral signatures for correlating events detected 
throughout the network, source material identification, and pictures of suspect 
vehicles to facilitate law enforcement operations.
· Waterway System. For the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) 
program, sponsored by DTRA, LLNL has developed systems for detecting and 
characterizing radioactive and nuclear threats delivered by water routes. Two 
buoys containing a suite of gamma and neutron detectors, telemetry systems, and 
solar- and wind-powered generators have been deployed at the waterway entrance 
to a U.S. Navy base.
· Neutron detectors. Alternate materials and methodologies for detecting neutrons 
offer the promise of more sensitive detection of nuclear materials.
Technology Deployment and Commercialization
Several LLNL-developed radiation detection technologies are being transitioned to the 
commercial sector. An electromechanically germanium detector has been 
commercialized as the ORTEC Detective, a portable radionuclide identifier using a high-
purity germanium detector and based on the RadScout technology licensed from LLNL. 
A second technology, the Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM) recently won an 
R&D 100 award. This NaI-based radiation detection system increases detector sensitivity 
and specificity to both high-speed moving sources and stationary sources through unique 
data analysis. The ARAM technology has been licensed to Innovative Survivability 
Technologies (IST) and is being used by the California Highway Patrol.
International Cooperative Efforts
As part of our integrated approach to nonproliferation and counterterrorism, LLNL is 
engaged in a number of projects addressing foreign border security and improving the 
ability of foreign customs services to detect and interdict illicit trafficking of weapons 
and weapons materials. Two phases of a DTRA-funded project to provide radiation portal 
monitoring system in Uzbekistan for the detection of smuggled nuclear materials has 
been completed. This work led to the development of a comprehensive plan for equipping 
approximately 40 points of entry in Uzbekistan with various types of radiation detection 
portal monitors (pedestrian, vehicle, rail).
We are collaborating with the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, via 
Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) projects to develop enhanced fixed 
and mobile radiological analytical capability to augment the indigenous scientific 
infrastructure in Uzbekistan to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear, radiological, chemical, 
and high explosive materials. To expand cooperation in nuclear forensics, LLNL is 
helping to expand the scope of the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working 
Group (ITWG), presenting a concept for the ITWG Nuclear Forensic Laboratories 
(INFL). The INFL is an association of active practitioners of nuclear forensics, with the 
object of advancing the science of nuclear forensics and serving the needs of states and 
law enforcement agencies.
Radiation Detection Cooperation with the IAEA
LLNL is developing a new safeguards tool—scintillator-based antineutrino detectors—
that will provide a non-intrusive, near-real-time, inexpensive way to measure changes in 
fissile content and total fission rates (i.e., power levels) at nuclear reactors. Detector 
Monte Carlo calculations, reactor simulations, and previous antineutrino detection 
experiments all demonstrate that a small detector placed a few tens of meters from a 
reactor core can measure gross power and fissile content of the reactor fuel in real time at 
the few-percent level or below. Experimental data are being acquired at the San Onofre 
California nuclear generating station to validate these simulations and experiments. This 
event rate will permit measurement of fuel burn-up and fissile content at the few-percent 
level with a few weeks of running. The ability to directly monitor fission processes from 
well outside the reactor core is unique to antineutrino detection. Use of such a detector 
for reactor safeguards offers several significant advantages. It provides a direct, 
continuous, and accurate measurement of changes in the amount of fissionable material 
in the reactor core, as opposed to the indirect and intermittent material surveillance and 
control methods (e.g., tags and seals) that are currently used. It can report the total end-
of-cycle plutonium inventory to within a few tens of kilograms or below.
Advanced radiation detection technology will enable the international community to 
more reliably protect itself from the dangers inherent in illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials. Such technology will also enable a greater degree of safeguards to be 
negotiated with respect to nuclear technology and the nuclear fuel cycle, thereby making 
an improved energy supply and hence improved living standard more accessible on a 
global scale.
